Journal of Social Computing
Volume 2

Issue 4

Article 3

2021

Real Estate Politik: Democracy and the Financialization of Social
Networks
Joanne Cheung
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.tsinghuajournals.com/journal-of-social-computing

Recommended Citation
Cheung, Joanne (2021) "Real Estate Politik: Democracy and the Financialization of Social Networks,"
Journal of Social Computing: Vol. 2: Iss. 4, Article 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23919/JSC.2021.0030
Available at: https://dc.tsinghuajournals.com/journal-of-social-computing/vol2/iss4/3

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Social Computing by an authorized editor of Tsinghua University
Press: Journals Publishing.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL COMPUTING
ISSN 2688-5255 03/06 pp323−336
Volume 2, Number 4, December 2021
DOI: 1 0 . 2 3 9 1 9 / J S C . 2 0 2 1 . 0 0 3 0

Real Estate Politik: Democracy and the Financialization
of Social Networks
Joanne Cheung*
Abstract: The power of social network platforms to amplify the scale, speed, and significance of everyday
communication is increasingly weaponized against democracy. Analyses of social networks predominantly
focus on design and its effects on politics. This article shifts the debate to their business model. Built as platform
businesses, social networks are privately owned public spaces with structurally limited democratic affordances.
Drawing from the history, theory, and practice of land use, I develop an analogy between the financialization
of land by commercial real estate development and the financialization of attention by platform businesses.
Historical policies, such as incentive zoning and exclusionary zoning, shed light on how platform businesses
use systems of measurement and valuation to conflate users’ roles, tokenize the incentives that drive behavior,
and defer the ethical responsibilities businesses have to the public. While the real estate framing reveals social
networks’ structural flaws and colonial roots, lessons from urban planning, community land trusts, and
Indigenous land stewardship can inform their regulation and reform. Building on the broader effort to embed
ethics in the development of technology, I describe possibilities to steward social networks in the public interest.
Key words: social networks; social media; platform studies; financialization; urban planning; land use

1

Introduction

While in the past there may have been difficulty in
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense)
for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It
is cyberspace—the “vast democratic forums of the
Internet” in general, and social media in particular.
– Anthony Kennedy, Former Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States[1]
The size of our user base and our users’ level of
engagement are critical to our success …We generate
substantially all of our revenue from selling advertising
placements to marketers.
– Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2020 filed by Facebook, Inc.[2]
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Cities have arisen through geographical and social
concentration of a surplus product. Urbanization has
always been a class phenomenon, since surpluses are
extracted from somewhere and someone, while the
control over their disbursement typically lies in a few
hands.
– David Harvey, “The Right to the City”[3]
In the Republic, Plato claimed the democratic affordance
of the ideal city was measured by the distance of a herald’s
cry. In the “virtual city” of social network platforms, the
speed and distance at which a user’s voice travels are
decoupled from physical constraints. Like providing a
speaker with a hyper-visible soapbox and a hyperamplified megaphone, social network platforms boost
the political power of an individual’s everyday
conversations. While these platforms have the potential
to expand democracy, their power instead has a growing
dark side. From misinformation and polarization to hate
speech and the incitation of violence, the power of social
networks is increasingly weaponized against democracy.
The history of technology for communication is
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deeply intertwined with the political history of the
empire[4–8]. With Meta Platforms (the parent
organization of Facebook) passing $1 trillion market
capitalization, social network platforms are effectively
a contemporary form of empire. By linking individuals’
communicative power with their spending power, the
platform simultaneously extracts market information
from individuals on the network and expands the
financial market for the network itself. The historical
origins of this model have been characterized by cultural
theorist Nicholas Mirzoeff as the “colonial complex”
(local surveillance of individuals) and the “imperial
complex” (the control of “primitive” remote populations
by a “cultured” centralized authority)[9]. As a platform
designed, developed, and headquartered in Silicon
Valley and deployed globally to its 2.91 billion monthly
active users[10], Facebook resembles both complexes:
the extent of its reach is planetary and the specificity of
its surveillance is intimate.
If communication at a distance enabled the creation of
empire, then the distance between the site of extraction
(the colony) and the site of authority (the administrative
center) is the basis of its power. The various
nomenclatures used to address social network platforms
conceal this distance. The term “social network
platforms” itself collapses the linguistic distance
between the site of extraction (the social network) and
the site of authority (the platform), thereby subsuming
the platform’s business-facing dimension within
discussions of public-facing social issues. The term
“social media” similarly overly focuses on the
consequences of user actions such as content moderation
and information integrity[11–14] and behavioral
implications of interface designs such as dark patterns,
persuasive design, and technological seduction[15–17].
While these analyses are critical for understanding the
symptoms and gravity of the problem, they are
insufficient for exposing the mechanisms underlying the
platform that are critical for their regulation and reform.
In order to expose the hidden mechanisms of platform
power and their effects on democracy, I will first
decouple “social network” from “platform” in analysis.
“Platform” is a multi-sided marketplace business that
develops and owns the technology infrastructure that
creates social networks. Situating social networks in
their current form within Lawrence Lessig’s framework
for regulation[18], I believe the market force bears direct
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responsibility for the systemic problems. Given the
outsized influence of the financial dimension, I direct the
critique from the platform’s design and technical
mechanisms to its financialization.
This article proceeds in three sections. The first section
links democratic practice in public space to social
networks, frames platform businesses as commercial
real estate development, and explores their democratic
affordances as “privately owned public space”. The
second section contextualizes the financialization of
attention in terms of the financialization of land,
historicizes how the platform business model encodes
colonial assumptions into its management systems for
measurement and valuation, and unpacks its
mechanisms and systemic effects on democracy. Finally,
the third section adapts lessons from urban planning and
land justice practices to the context of social networks
and proposes new possibilities for roles, incentives, and
responsibilities to steward social networks in the public
interest.

2

Democracy in Privately Owned Public
Space

The health of democracy is sustained by communication
in everyday life[19–21]. In Democracy and Education,
philosopher John Dewey[22] described democracy as
“more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode
of associated living, of conjoint communicated
experience”. While American voters cast their ballot in
the presidential elections every four years, the decision
recorded in that instance forms over time. Through
everyday interactions with their community, individuals
deliberate political opinions that shape their democratic
decision-making. Spaces beyond the voting booth—the
community center, the neighborhood park, and the
library—bear a democratic purpose: to enable a
heterogeneous population to recognize and celebrate
their differences[23–25]. They set the conditions for
democratic life.
Social networks expand the space for the “conjoint
communicated experience” defined by Dewey. Between
2010 and 2021, the percentage of Americans using
platforms to regularly communicate increased from 47%
to 72%[26]. Alongside this growth, a host of design,
regulatory, and ethical challenges arise when the
democratic affordance of physical space extends into the
virtual realm. From Facebook groups acting as virtual
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assemblies to hashtag activism[27–29], social networks’
unique communication features[30, 31] and digital
architecture[32] introduce new dynamics and risks. While
participation on social networks transformed the ways
people engage politically, how they should be governed
as political forums remains under debate. In 2017, the
Supreme Court case Packingham v. North Carolina (582
US __) held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting sex
offenders from accessing social network platforms
violated the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the holdings of the case, Justice
Kennedy described social networks as the “modern
public square”, drawing an analogy between access to
online communication and access to public space. In
2021, Knight Institute v. Trump ruled that by blocking
several users, President Trump had violated the First
Amendment because comment threads on Twitter
constituted a public forum; the case was later rendered
moot in the ruling for Biden v. Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University (593 U.S. __) after
Trump’s presidency ended and his own Twitter access
was terminated. In his opinion, Justice Thomas
expressed the urgent need to regulate platforms that
build social networks: “We will soon have no choice but
to address how our legal doctrines apply to highly
concentrated,
privately
owned
information
infrastructure such as digital platforms.”
Platforms are hybrid entities: privately owned
businesses that offer public service. Borrowing a term
from urban planning[33], a platform is a privately owned
public space. Although users may experience them as a
“modern public square”, their underlying economic
incentive and legal constructs are much closer to that of
commercial real estate development. The goals they
serve are inherently dissonant: a public square exists to
serve the public interest, while commercial real estate
exists to generate return on capital. Platforms’ private
ownership structurally constrains their democratic
affordance. When public and private interests clash,
platforms’ allegiances will favor the private over the
public.
This dynamic played out during the Occupy Wall
Street protests in Zuccotti Park, a privately owned public
space in the Financial District of Manhattan, New York
City. Zuccotti Park was constructed in 1972 alongside
One Liberty Plaza, a 2.3-million-square-foot office
tower currently valued at $1.55 billion. Both the tower
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and the park are owned by Brookfield Office Properties
(with the park named after company chairman John
Zuccotti). Brookfield Office Properties is a subsidiary of
the commercial real estate company, Brookfield
Property Partners, which itself is a subsidiary of one of
the world’s largest alternative asset management
companies with over $625 billion of assets under
management. Zuccotti Park is one of more than 500
privately owned public spaces in New York City created
through a “Floor Area Bonus for a Plaza” regulation in
the 1961 New York City Zoning Resolution. This
regulation—commonly
known
as
Incentive
Zoning—incentivized the creation of open spaces in
urban areas with high real estate value by permitting
developers an additional ten square feet of built space in
exchange for one square foot of “an open area accessible
to the public at all times”[34]. “The equivalent of thirty
average New York City blocks” was created as a result,
“at no direct cost to the public”[35]. Privately owned
public space was meant to be a win-win for both the
public and the private sectors.
The Occupy Wall Street protest revealed the limits of
the democratic affordances of the privately owned
public space. Occupy Wall Street protesters turned
Zuccotti Park into a makeshift village with tents and
shared communal resources[36] and exercised consensus
decision making. As the park’s owners, Brookfield
Office Properties maintained the power to amend the
park’s code of conduct—and they did. The new
amendments banned “tents, sleeping bags, and lying
down”[37], which were then used as grounds to evict
Occupy protesters from the park. Zuccotti Park’s
democratic affordance was weakened by its private
ownership, and a movement centered on financial
inequality was ultimately evicted by the center of
financial power.
Privately owned public spaces like Zuccotti Park exist
not because of a direct investment in democratic public
spaces. Rather, they are byproducts of high-profit
skyscrapers developed during real estate market booms
when the speculative value of the building soars above
the material value of the land[38, 39]. The incentive behind
the creation of the park therefore lies precisely in profit
maximization. Born from the dissonance of extreme
public and private interest, Zuccotti Park and One
Liberty Plaza are inextricably linked; the park could not
have existed without the tower. This dependency
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fundamentally weakens the park’s democratic
affordance. Public good is subsumed by the logic of
financial capital and public interest is lodged within the
most extreme expression of private interests.
Social networks and platform businesses have an
interdependent relationship similar to Zuccotti Park and
One Liberty Plaza. Social networks would not exist
without platform businesses and their social benefits are
intertwined with their profit-seeking purpose.
Businesses like Facebook operate under a platform
business model that relies on the public to serve its
private interests. They are multi-sided marketplaces with
“many faces”[40]. Rather than creating value on a linear
supply chain, a platform business generates revenue by
connecting the multiple groups and brokering exchanges
between them[41, 42]. Different from a traditional market,
where the transaction occurs directly between the buyer
and the supplier, exchanges between buyers of ads
(advertisers) and suppliers (users) on a platform are
indirect. Users not only supply attention for the ads, they
also supply data about how they use their attention,
which helps continuously improve the accuracy and
value of Facebook ads. No real goods is exchanged on
a multi-sided advertising market. Instead, advertisers
who buy Facebook ads are buying the possibility to turn
Facebook users into their future customers.
Consumption begets more consumption.
Facebook principally mediates three layers of
exchanges: (1) between users and their social groups,
(2) between individuals and the platform, and (3)
between the platform and its clients, third-party
advertisers. The terms of exchange across these layers
are not equal. In the user-facing layer, the exchange
centers on everyday communication. On the clientfacing side, the exchange centers on conversion: the
moment the audience of the advertisement performs an
action desired by the advertiser, such as discovering and
purchasing a product. The platforms’ objective is to
reduce conversion time and increase the number of
converted
people.
The
second
layer
of
exchange—between users and the platform—is the most
opaque and hidden in black-box algorithms[43]. By
positioning itself as a free service whose purpose is to
enable users to connect and build community, Facebook
turns non-financial exchanges (between users) into
financial ones. In other words, the platform financializes
everyday communication into sellable data, social
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relations into marketing channels, and users into
consumers, while obscuring the terms of its
financialization.
To disentangle the conflicting private and public
interests in platforms, we must understand how
financialization works. In the next section, I build on the
analogy between platforms and real estate development
and use the financialization of land to illuminate
problematic mechanisms and their effects in the
financialization of attention.

3

Financialization of Land and Attention

With its multifaceted dynamics, financialization has
been characterized as cognitive capitalism[44], supply
chain capitalism[45], racial capitalism[46], platform
capitalism[47], surveillance capitalism[48], rentier
capitalism[49, 50], technoscientific capitalism[51], and
terror capitalism[52], as well as part of the growing field
of “platform studies”[53, 54]. Due to its extractive effects,
financialization of human cognitive capacities has been
termed “immaterial labor”[55], “attention brokerage”[56],
and the “subprime attention crisis”[57]. While
financialization has extensively reconfigured the
language, culture, and patterns of contemporary
life[58–60], its mechanisms are not entirely new. Rather,
they bear striking resemblance to colonial patterns of
dispossession[61–67].
Both commercial real estate development and
platform businesses financialize finite resources: land
and attention. They do so through systems that measure
and assign value, and in the process, reconstruct colonial
myths in everyday life.
Measurement systems serve the purpose of the
authority who institutes them. Scholars across
philosophy, geography, anthropology, and more have
termed this process “classification”[9], “the nomination
of the visible”[68], “commensuration”[69], and “modular
simplification”[70]. Measurement systems not only
represent but also construct what they measure[71, 72]. As
sociologist Donald MacKenzie writes, they are “not a
camera, but an engine”. The distinguishing feature of
both land and attention measurement lies in how
extensively the process subsumes otherwise nonfinancial entities[73–76] within its financial logic and as a
consequence reduces the relevance of local contexts[77]
in service of increasing the efficiency of the financial
exchange.
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Historical processes of land measurement encoded a
colonial myth: before being made legible to the
centralized authority, settlers of the American West
declared that land existed in a “pristine” state, untouched
by “humans”. By discounting the humanity and
stewardship of indigenous populations, the “pristine”
myth helped justify the dispossession of Indigenous
populations[78–83] and normalize the exploitation of
“virgin land”[84] as monocultural fields optimized for
commodity crops[85–88]. This myth sheds light on the
extractive assumption that platforms make about
participants on social networks: that people’s attention,
like land, is “unprocessed data”[89] ready to be converted
into and exchanged as financial assets.
Once an entity has been converted into a financial asset,
it is then assigned value by a centralized authority with
the purpose of accruing it. The asset becomes sorted
based on its perceived productivity—that is, its ability to
generate profit. For example, the practice of scientific
forestry optimized forests for lumber output—an asset
that could generate profit—while excluding all other
vegetation, which resulted in the systematic
deterioration of soil health and ecosystem collapse[90].
Being embedded within the definition of productivity is
a value judgement: the idea that certain entities are more
valuable than others is an assumption and not a fact of
nature, and the assumption is often made by a centralized
authority about a site of extraction. The myth of
productivity helps maintain the power of the centralized
authority by intentionally obfuscating the subjectivity of
its value system, rendering the systemic biases
embedded within this judgment to appear normalized in
practice. This myth, based on the colonial assumption
that certain uses of land (agricultural cultivation) are
more “productive” than others (Indigenous land use),
was used to exclude Indigenous land and people[91].
The productivity myth is deeply ingrained into the
financialization of land today. “Highest and best use” is
a framework commonly used in commercial real estate
development to appraise the potential profit of a piece
of land and decide on its use. Created by economist
Irving Fisher, the framework assesses land use based on
four criteria: the development must be (1) legally
permissible, (2) physically possible, (3) financially
feasible, and (4) maximally productive. The last
criterion, “maximally productive”, means that the
chosen development should prioritize a type of use (for
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example, hotel over housing) that could generate
maximum profit, disregarding the parcel’s current
purpose[92]. Uses that are not “maximally
productive”—the balance of various types of
commercial, civic, and residential programs, a diverse
mix of residents, or the availability of transportation
infrastructure that promotes active lifestyles—do not
factor into this analysis because their benefits cannot be
quantified as direct revenue.
Systems of measurement and valuation do not operate
linearly, they reinforce one another iteratively. The
history of land use demonstrates this self-reinforcing
dynamic: measurement serves to progressively
subdivide land while the value of the land progressively
increases[93]. This dynamic also plays out in the
financialization of attention by platform businesses.
With the more granular subdivision of attention through
user engagement, such as “like” and “share” and more
accurate valuation of user behaviors, the value of
attention increases in turn. When left unchecked, this
dynamic complicates the roles, incentives, and
responsibilities that are key to maintaining the health of
democratic practice.
Using lessons from real estate and urban development,
I expose three mechanisms platforms used to
financialize attention: (1) conflate user roles in ways that
undermine their agency, (2) tokenize the incentives
behind everyday communication to drive up
engagement, and (3) use proxy metrics to defer the social
responsibility inherent in exclusionary practices.
3.1

Conflate roles

Platforms exploit the intersection of surveillance
capitalism and identity politics. Individuals are valued
for their authenticity while being asked to play multiple
roles. Engagement metrics, such as “like” and “share”,
privilege the quantity and frequency of individuals’
immediate reactions while reducing their agency in their
actions. These mechanisms conflate roles in two
ways. In an era of information overflow, authentic
self-expressions—which is scarce by nature—has
become a valuable commodity. How people express
themselves reveals their preferences, interests, and
connections and affirms their position as a member of
their social network. However, these expressions are
also the key input into platforms’ mechanisms for
increasing conversion—algorithmic ranking and
personalized
advertisements—that
influence
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individuals’ purchasing and political decisions. Herein
lies platform extraction: using the authenticity of an
individual’s role as a member of their social group to
categorize and predict their role as a consumer (of
commercial products and political advertising). The two
roles that an individual is asked to play on a platform are
not equally consensual. To an individual user, the
platform markets itself as a provider of communication
infrastructure and not as an advertising channel
personalized based on their personal data. In blurring
these two roles, the extent to which an individual’s
behavior in their first role (as a member of their social
group) is influenced by their second role (as a consumer)
becomes obscured as well.
Optimizing for engagement also conflates otherwise
separate roles in the information supply chain:
individual users are not only consumers—they are also
producers and distributors. These separate roles
typically enable the terms of transaction for each activity
to be clearly delineated. However, interactions on the
platform are designed to encourage all three types of
activities at once. On Facebook, for example, all posts in
the News Feed are followed with the “like” button, the
“comment” button, and the “share” button. Furthermore,
these engagement interactions are all reward-based. The
quantity of “likes” given to a piece of content rewards
producers with a sense of popularity. Badges such as
“Top
Fan”—awarded
to
the
most
active
participants—turn communication into competition. By
communicating through the platforms, individuals
become unwitting contestants in the commodification of
their authenticity.

transaction as carefully as they would with a cash
transaction.
Similarly, when a user posts on the platform, he/she
does not need to specify his/her intended audience.
Every interaction on Facebook—be it a post, a comment,
or a “like”—is, by default, broadcast to the entirety of the
user’s social network. If a user is required to specify to
whom they are speaking every time they write a post,
they would be more likely to consider the immediate
consequences of their action. By removing choice in one’s
audience, the psychological distance between the social
cost of an interaction and the interaction itself widens,
and user engagement increases as a result.
Considering current debates around the limits of social
cognition online[96–98], tokenizing social incentives
exploits and undermines the cognitive limits of
individuals on social networks. Responses to this
extractive pattern have themselves been subsumed by
financialization. The rise of the social quantification
sector[67] capitalizes on the extraction of attention as well
as its conservation. In the last decade, “digital
mindfulness”—from meditation apps to features like
Screen Time—has become a billion-dollar business; in
parallel, social network platforms feed emotions into the
“outrage industry”[99]. Like the false dichotomy of land
as either a pristine wilderness[78] or a site of extraction,
seeing people’s attention as either “protected” or
“exploited” ultimately distracts from the extent of
disempowerment caused by platforms and the fact that
both result in the commodification of authenticity.

3.2

Proxy metrics defer social responsibility to the technical
implementations of the system. This form of obfuscation
makes the values (such as racial discrimination or the
relentless pursuit of profit) that fundamentally drive
decisions shielded from direct critique.
In the context of cities, the ongoing struggle for
segregation demonstrates the extent to which
exclusionary practices have co-evolved with the history
of urban development. Discrimination acts and persists,
indirectly, through proxy metrics that encode bias. If
measures to counteract discrimination are not
proactively instituted, exclusionary practices will
reinforce discrimination. In the early 1900s, White
homeowners who perceived people of color as a threat
to their property value began adopting racially restrictive
covenants to bar people of color from home ownership

Tokenize incentives

Similar to how casinos turn cash into token currencies in
the form of gambling chips, platforms turn incentives
driving social interactions into token currencies in the
form of “likes” and “shares”. Token currencies increase
the psychological distance between the cost of
consumption and the action of consumption, and as a
consequence, they make it easier for users to consume
more[94]. Management scientist and economist Drazen
Prelec refers to token currencies as “hedonic buffers”:
“by buffering themselves between real money and
consumption, they protect consumption from the moral
tax”[95]. When purchasing a token currency, the
consumer does not need to specify how the currency will
be used. When the consumer spends the currency, they
do not feel the need to evaluate the implications of the

3.3

Defer responsibilities
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in their neighborhoods. When the federal government
created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation with the
aim to expand home ownership opportunities as a part
of the New Deal, rather than proactively mitigating the
racial discrimination, government surveyors based their
neighborhood ranking system on local officials’ and
bankers’ racially charged risk assessments. In this way,
they encoded racial discrimination into the value of
land[100, 101], which resulted in racial segregation and
concentrated poverty that still persist today[102–106].
Beyond the direct encoding of exclusion, single-family
zoning ordinances conceal the discrimination behind
proxy metrics like building density. Institutionalized by
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.(1977), single-family zoning de facto
separates lower-income populations—disproportionately
racial minorities—from wealthier populations[107],
perpetuating systemic disinvestments.
Proxy metrics for revenue used by platforms make the
prioritization of private profit at the expense of other
public good an unquestioned practice, and they
underscore how extensively the entanglements between
exclusionary practice and finance have been normalized.
Instead of proactively integrating different perspectives,
platforms by default algorithmically rank messages
based on relevance, measured as “the number of
comments, likes, and reactions a post receives”[108].
Algorithmic ranking prioritizes messages that support
one’s preexisting beliefs and exclude ones that may
challenge those beliefs. Changes to the default sorting
method, such as chronological sorting, must be manually
selected by the user. Although Facebook’s News Feed
preferences proclaim to let individuals “take control and
customize” the feed, the only way a user can make
changes is to prune their News Feed: to add or remove
up to 30 users to be prioritized to “see first”. Individuals
have no power to meaningfully change the exclusionary
ranking mechanism that determines the value of what
they see.
This systematic reinforcement of confirmation bias
undermines a fundamental condition for a healthy
democracy: a shared context that includes divergent
beliefs, founded on a spirit of generosity rather than
animosity. The efficacy of democratic practice lies in the
collective ability to empathize, internalize, and reconcile
differing opinions and beliefs. As anthropologist
Elizabeth Povinelli writes, “The power of a particular
form of communication to commensurate morally and
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epistemologically divergent social groups lies at the
heart of liberal hopes for a nonviolent democratic form
of governmentality”.
Filtering one’s interactions based on existing
preferences and social connections narrows the context
of one’s preexisting beliefs. In Liberalism and Social
Action, John Dewey[109] writes, “The method of
democracy is to bring conflicts out into the open where
their special claims can be seen and appraised, where
they can be discussed and judged in light of more
inclusive interests than are represented by either of them
separately”. The “meaningful inefficiencies”[110]
inherent in the integration of diverse perspectives is
foundation for democracy and yet is at odds with the
platforms’ exclusive focus on productivity. If social
networks are to exist in service of democracy, then they
need to proactively create the conditions for
pluralism—to make it possible and desirable to reconcile
differences rather than obscuring or exploiting them for
profit.
In order to mitigate the systemic biases inherent in
social networks and the detrimental effects of social
exclusion, the first step is to question the status quo.
Historically, land use that supports democracy has not
been a given; it needed to be directly advocated for and
formalized through law. The same expectations should
be set for the democratic affordance of social networks.
The Montgomery bus boycott, Freedom Rides, and
many other protests of the civil rights movement were
fights for African Americans to gain equal rights in
public space. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended
segregation in the public space, and the Fair Housing Act
of 1978 made it illegal to write racially restrictive
covenants into property deeds. A part of the work of
changing the system is to expose its mechanisms. As
Richard Rothstein advocated in The Color of Law,
revealing how the mechanisms work creates
opportunities for their reform. In the next section, I draw
from the practice of urban planning and land justice
movements to imagine new roles, incentives, and
responsibilities for social networks.

4

Reclaim
Social
Financialization

Networks

from

Reclaiming social networks from financialization will
require creating mechanisms that align the incentives of
the platform with the public interest. This begins with
recognizing the colonial underpinnings of American
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democracy[111–114] and relinquishing the nostalgic vision
of the colonial New England town halls. To create a
collective space for an experimentalist democracy fit for
our time, we need to embrace rather than obscure the
“contingency of context”[115] of our globally connected
society. Using lessons from urban planning, land justice,
and Indigenous land stewardship, I propose three
mechanisms to help reclaim social networks from
financialization and reorient them to the public interest:
(1) use urban planning to redefine roles that have been
conflated by platforms, (2) use community land trusts to
illustrate how public interest can be protected from
market forces, and (3) use the practice of Indigenous land
stewardship to inspire new thinking about the meaning
of social responsibility.
4.1

Redefine roles: “urban planning”

Urban planning can serve as a model for a professional
role that serves the public interest. As designers of public
space, urban planners must wrestle with large private
interests while they “continuously pursue and faithfully
serve the public interest”[116]. In order to receive the
licensure to practice—and to ensure that “the public
interest” prevails in these negotiations—urban planners
must follow Ethical Principles set by the American
Planning Association’s Institute of Certified Planners:
(1) Recognize the rights of citizens to participate in
planning decisions;
(2) Strive to give citizens (including those who lack
formal organization or influence) full, clear, and
accurate information on planning issues and the
opportunity to have a meaningful role in the
development of plans and programs;
(3) Strive to expand choice and opportunity for all
persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for
the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons;
(4) Assist in the clarification of community goals,
objectives, and policies in plan-making;
(5) Ensure that reports, records, and any other
non-confidential information which is, or will be,
available to decision makers is made available to the
public in a convenient format and sufficiently in advance
of any decision;
(6) Strive to protect the integrity of the natural
environment and the heritage of the built environment;
(7) Pay special attention to the interrelatedness of
decisions and the long-range consequences of present

actions.
Given the similarity in challenges faced by urban
planners and stewards of social networks, the American
Planning Association’s Ethical Principles seem
eminently applicable to their roles. Values of inclusivity,
fairness, and transparency are all values that should
guide the design of a healthy digital democracy. As a
thought experiment, what if platforms adopted the
following ethical principles, based on the ones set forth
by the American Planning Association?
(1) Recognize the rights of people to participate in
platform design decisions;
(2) Strive to give people (including those who lack
formal organization or influence) full, clear, and
accurate information on product development issues and
the opportunity to have a meaningful role in the design
and development of the platform;
(3) Strive to expand choice and opportunity for all
persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for
the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons;
(4) Assist in the clarification of community goals,
objectives, and policies in plan-making;
(5) Ensure that reports, records, and any other
non-confidential information which is, or will be,
available to decision makers is made available to the
public in a convenient format and sufficiently in advance
of any decision;
(6) Strive to protect the integrity of the digital public
sphere;
(7) Pay special attention to the interrelatedness of
decisions and the long-range consequences of present
actions.
These ethical principles would encourage better
decisions on the level of individual designers. However,
though these principles reflect core democratic values, to
substantively improve the business of the platforms,
ethical principles are far from enough. Individuals’
decisions and responsibilities correlate to their
decision-making power and scope of accountability. A
designer or engineer at the level of an “individual
contributor” in a technology company may be
responsible for their own output, such as a “share” button
or refresh content controls. While their design decisions
potentially shape the communication systems between
billions of people, their social impact massively exceeds
their power within the organization. Even if the designer
or engineer adopted these ethical principles in the public
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interest, they would face enormous barriers in practice
and would personally bear the risk of acting against the
interest of their employers. Ethical principles must
operate in a context that is greater than any individual
designer or organization; they need to align with or shift
the incentive structure of the business model.
In land use, urban planning and real estate
development are different fields with distinct duties and
ethics. Social network platforms, in their current
formation,
collapse
incentives,
roles,
and
responsibilities that help preserve meaningful checks
and balances between the private and public interests. In
the absence of an equivalent field of “urban planning”
dedicated to the public interest for social networks,
platforms are driven exclusively as commercial real
estate development. Recognizing the different
incentives behind these two professions is critical for
discussions on technology ethics. Unlike urban planners,
commercial real estate developers have no professional
association nor explicit ethical principles. Codes of
ethics are often found in fiduciary duty-defined
relationships, which obligates a practitioner to act solely
in the interests of their client—for example, doctor and
patient. Real estate developers, on the other hand, do not
have a fiduciary duty towards the users of buildings they
develop. Instead, they act in accordance with the profit
motives of their investors, whose interest in maximizing
the bottom line is often at odds with the interest of users.
Similarly, social network platforms act in the best
interest of their investors, shareholders, and clients
(advertisers), which leads neither to the benefit nor
protection of the participants in the network.
Because of this misalignment of individual and
organizational values inherent in social network
platforms, it will be critical to develop “public interest”
roles for social networks, the equivalent of urban
planners and land justice activists—professions with a
fiduciary duty that aligns with their democratic
responsibilities. In addition, beyond growing the field of
public interest designers and technologists, institutions
need to continue to create permanent positions for these
roles to ensure their long-term viability.
4.2

Restore incentives: “community land trusts”

Current debates around individual data ownership apply
property rights to address inequities in monetization, but
this approach is limited. In Colonial Lives of Property,
legal scholar Brenna Bhandar unpacks how colonial
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logics have shaped modern conceptions of property and
created “the racial regimes of ownership”[117, 118].
Focusing on individual data ownership shifts the burden
to individuals without addressing the commodification
of their attention in the first place. Similarly, fixes that
regulate
individual
user
behavior—such
as
automatically limiting the time a user can spend on
platforms (Social Media Addiction Reduction
Technology Act 2019)—do not address the root of the
problem. Real change requires creating alternatives to
existing platforms that differentiate ownership from use
and remove attention from the commodity market.
Community land trusts are nonprofit organizations
that own and hold land in perpetuity in the permanent
benefit of the communities they serve[119]. Robert Swann,
who formalized the concept of the community land trust
in Community Land Trust: A Guide to a New Model of
Land Tenure in America, connects the concept to
historical roots in Indigenous land stewardship:
“American Indian tradition holds that the land belongs to
God. Individual ownership and personal possession of
land and resources were unknown”[120]. Community
land trusts remove land from the commodity market,
thereby buffering it from the booms and busts of the real
estate market cycles. Crucially, a community land trust
decouples the incentive of ownership from the incentive
of use. Ownership is maintained in the public interest,
while use allows for private interests through 99-year
ground leases, the longest possible term of lease of real
estate property. The community ownership of land
aligns the incentives of the users and the owners; users
have long-term access to affordable space, and the trust
has a strong legal position to serve its mission and
preserve affordability.
To develop an analogous mechanism for social
networks that could incentivize the platform to serve its
people in the long term, we must recognize how the
community land trust is inextricably linked to place.
While the legal arrangement can be replicated across
geographies and adapted to suit local needs, a
community land trust is anchored in its specific
community. This usage of “community” is entirely
different from the “community” used in Facebook’s
mission statement (“Facebook’s mission is to give
people the power to build community and bring the
world closer together”). The community of a community
land trust is defined by and bound by place, whereas the
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“community” of Facebook refers to its user base and is
both decoupled from place and ever-expanding. Further,
the residents in the community have voting power by
holding board seats in the community land trust;
Facebook users have no such power. Reclaiming social
networks for the real benefit of communities means that
a community, defined by place, should own the
technology infrastructure and decision-making power in
its use.
4.3

Reframe responsibilities: “Indigenous land
stewardship”

Indigenous land stewardship is an example of collective
stewardship that creates systems-level ecological
benefits like biodiversity[121] and resilience[122–125]. The
success of this practice depends on a mutually
constitutive relationship between people and land. As
Native American poet Paula Gunn Allen writes, “We are
the land... The land is not really the place (separate from
ourselves) where we act out the drama of our isolate
destinies. It is not a means of survival, a setting for our
affairs... It is rather a part of our being, dynamic,
significant, real. It is ourself”[126]. The responsibility to
care for the land and care for the self are one and the same.
Learning from this practice, we can reorient social
networks from financialization to care. This shift
suggests a new approach to thinking about social
responsibilities: from being external to being embodied.
Likewise, the technology that serves this community
must not act from a distance; it must be co-designed.
Laura Mannell, Frank Palermo, and Crispin Smith wrote
in Reclaiming Indigenous Urban Planning, “A
community plan cannot be developed from the outside
looking in. It cannot be done for a community, it must
be done with and by a community”. [127] A community’s
social network, similarly, must be created with and by
the community. Technology that supports social
networks in the public interest begins with honoring the
existing knowledge, capacities, and practices in a
community as its starting point.
The fact that urban planning, community land trusts,
and Indigenous land stewardship are all not-for-profit
practices that exist to primarily serve social good brings
up a natural question: can social network reforms based
on lessons from these practices be achieved from within
existing for-profit platform businesses? Fully
addressing this question—which is fundamentally about
transforming the political economy of data—is beyond

the scope of this article. However, I do wish to highlight
three entry points that are specifically relevant to
businesses. First, businesses comprise groups of
employees who hold a plurality of motivations and
beliefs; these differences can and should be channeled
towards social change. Second, profit and social good
are not necessarily mutually exclusive; businesses with
broad-based shared ownership and cooperative
governance structures naturally align with democratic
practice. Third, coloniality runs deep in the culture of
technology; recognizing colonial inequities within
organizational culture itself is a critical first step.

5

Conclusion

Social networks are now an undeniable public forum.
However, their democratic potential has been undercut
by the goals of platform businesses and their
mechanisms of financialization. The incentives driving
the platform set private and public interests in direct
conflict. As publicly traded companies, platforms are
ultimately accountable to their shareholders and must
prioritize private interests—the health of the business,
defined by its profitability and market share—over the
public interest and the health of democracy. As privately
owned public spaces in their current form, social
networks’ public-facing experiences, which purport to
champion connection and community in practice
obscure the extractive nature of their business model.
Connection is exploited for its network power to expand
the customer base; community is exploited as an input
into a platform’s advertising product. The language,
interactions, and relationships of social networks have
been coopted.
In order to reclaim social networks from
financialization by platform businesses, we need to first
expose the systems and mechanisms driving the process.
As this article has shown, the financialization of land
provides a critical lens for examining the systems that
enable the financialization of attention and the
constitutive role colonialism played in shaping them.
Examples from land use also demonstrate possibilities
for rethinking roles, incentives, and responsibilities,
shifting social networks from extraction to mutualism,
from expansion to place. Given this new understanding,
I hope we can move from critique to creation and
collaboratively build the theoretical frameworks, legal
instruments, funding models, technical infrastructure,
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and social norms to steward social networks in the public
interest.
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